Американская военная машина. Глубинная политика, глобальная связь ЦРУ с наркотиками и путь в Афганистан - Питер Дейл Скотт

in Seattle before joining the White House, but he had previously been involved with the CIA in Vietnam. Krogh bragged to Ehrlichman that he had hand-carried gold for the CIA to Vietnam. Ehrlichman and Haldeman later came to believe that Krogh maintained ties to the Agency even during his time at the White House. Neither allegation was ever proven” (Colodny and Schachtman, The Forty Years’ War, 101, 113).

36. Jeremy Kuzmarov, “From Counter-Insurgency to Narco-Insurgency: Vietnam and the International War on Drugs,” Journal of Policy History 20, no. 3 (2008): 358–59, citing many sources, including Southeast Asian Narcotics, Hearings before the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, House of Representatives, 95th Cong., 1st sess., July 12–13, 1977 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1978), 2–3. See also Surachert Bamrungsuk, U.S. Foreign Policy and Thai Military Rule, 1947–1977 (Bangkok: Editions Duangkamol, 1988).

37. I have read but have not been able to verify that often the tribes selected for this treatment were those not paying off the Thai police and BPP.

38. Jim Glassman, Thailand at the Margins: Internationalization of the State and the Transformation of Labour (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 67–68: “Red Gaur groups were controlled by General Withoon Yasawat, a former leader of CIA-hired Thai mercenary forces in Laos, and General Chatchai Choonhavan, son of Phin, brother-in-law of Phao, and later Prime Minister.”

39. William Shawcross, “How Tyranny Returned to Thailand,” New York Review of Books, December 9, 1976.

40. Chris Baker and Phasut Phongphaichit, A History of Thailand (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 194–95; cf. Handley, The King Never Smiles, 235–36: “After a free-fire order was issued by the Bangkok police chief, the campus was stormed like an enemy army’s redoubt, with the . . . BPP troops in front.” This propaganda campaign built on earlier false reports in 1975, when Colby was still CIA chief (Handley, The King Never Smiles, 226). Still earlier, in the 1950s, “the CIA and the U.S. Information Service [were] manufacturing fake communist tracts in Thai that attacked the monarchy” (Handley, The King Never Smiles, 124).

41. Robert Harris, Political Corruption in and beyond the Nation State (London: Routledge, 2003), 181.

42. “The Murky Events of October 1973: A Book Proposal Reopens Thailand’s wounds,” AsiaWeek, February 3, 2000; http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/

magazine/2000/0128/as.thai.history1.html). See also Benedict Anderson, “Withdrawal Symptoms,” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 9, no. 3 (1977), in Benedict Anderson, The Spectre of Comparisons (London: Verso, 1998), 139–73.

43. Handley, The King Never Smiles, 229.

44. Handley, The King Never Smiles, 226. Cf. Shawcross, “How Tyranny Returned to Thailand”: “When the Thai foreign minister visited Hanoi in August [1976] the army disrupted his visit by provoking simultaneous attacks upon thousands of Thailand’s Vietnamese residents.”

45. K. J. Clymer, The United States and Cambodia (London: Routledge, 2004), 22.

46. Peter Dale Scott, Drugs, Oil, and War: The United States in Afghanistan, Colombia, and Indochina (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 174, 182–83, citing, inter alia, Wilfred Burchett, The Second Indochina War: Cambodia and Laos (New York: International Publishers, 1970), 65.

47. See Peter Dale Scott, “Drugs and Oil: The Deep Politics of US Asian Wars,” in War and State Terrorism: The United States, Japan, and the Asia-Pacific in the Long Twentieth Century, ed. Mark Selden and Alvin Y. So (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 171–98.

48. Michael Leifer, Dictionary of the Modern Politics of Southeast Asia (London: Routledge, 1995), 94: “With the onset of the Cambodian conflict [in 1979], the Thai Communists were driven out of sanctuaries in Laos and their cause was sacrificed by China to the need to align with Thailand to challenge Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia. From that juncture, the Thai Communist movement began to collapse until it had ceased to exist as a viable entity by the end of the Cold War.” Cf. Baker, A History of Thailand, 216–20.

49. Bertil Lintner, “Heroin and Highland Insurgency in the Golden Triangle,” in War on Drugs: Studies in the Failure of U.S. Narcotics Policy, ed. Alfred W. McCoy and Alan A. Block (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), 296. Cf. Bertil Lintner, Burma in Revolt: Opium and Insurgency since 1948 (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 1999), 278. McCoy, relying on USG data, disagrees tacitly with Lintner and claims that while Nelson Gross’s statement “was pure media hyperbole, Lo [Hsing-han] had in fact become the largest single opium merchant in the Shan states” (McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 424). But Adrian Cowell, a British filmmaker who spent time first with Lo Hsing Han and later with Khun Sa, agrees with Lintner that Lo Hsing Han “was by no means one of the biggest sort of merchants in the business” (Adrian Cowell, Frontline, 1977, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/heroin/interviews/cowell.html).

50. Valentine, The Strength of the Pack, 173–74.

51. Lintner, Burma in Revolt, 279–81; cf. Cowell, Frontline.

52. San Francisco Chronicle, July 20, 1973, 18.

53. Epstein, Agency of Fear, 161; James Mills, The Underground Empire: Where Crime and Government Embrace (New York: Dell, 1986), 777 (two-thirds). Cf. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976 (hereinafter FRUS) (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office), vol. 20, 328–30, Memorandum of February 29, 1972, from the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger). Egil Krogh, chairman of the White House Committee on International Narcotics Control, also traveled to the Far East and bought out heroin labs in the Golden Triangle (Epstein, Agency of Fear, 237; Russ Baker, Family of Secrets: The Bush Dynasty, the Powerful Forces That Put It in the White House, and What Their Influence Means for America [New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2009], 225–26).

54. Valentine, The Strength of the Pack, 172–73. There is partially declassified discussion of the proposal in FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. 20, 286, 297–98.

55. Valentine, The Strength of the Pack, 174, citing correspondence with Fred Dick.

56. Valentine, The Strength of the Pack, 174; cf. 399; Lintner, Burma in Revolt, 179.

57. Valentine, The Strength of the Pack, 172.

58. Lintner, Burma in Revolt,